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The 1994 Everglades Forever Act ("Act") authorized the South
Florida Water Management District ("District") to levy a tax on
property owners within the district for pollution abatement purposes.
Non-polluter property owners within the taxation district claimed they
could not be taxed under the Act because Amendment 5, adopted in
1996, prohibited this taxation. Amendment 5 made property owners
within the district who caused pollution primarily responsible for
paying the abatement cost of their pollution. Thus, non-polluter
property owners argued they could not be taxed under the Act
because Amendment 5 superceded the general provisions of the Act.
The non-polluter property owners unsuccessfully challenged the
District's statutory basis to tax under the Act in the Circuit Court for
Orange County and appealed to the Court of Appeals of Florida, Fifth
District.
In affirming the circuit court, the appellate court based its holding
on a Supreme Court of Florida advisory opinion that stated
Amendment 5 was not a self-executing amendment. This advisory
opinion elaborated by stating the Act was not the enabling legislation
for Amendment 5. Because the Act was not Amendment 5's enabling
legislation and Amendment 5 had no enabling legislation, the Act
would be effective until the legislature expressly repealed it.
The appellate court held it could not tell the legislature when to
enact legislation nor dictate the substance of legislation. As a result,
the appellate court lacked the power to override the will of the people
who adopted Amendment 5, which required supplemental legislation
prior to enactment. Thus, the appellate court affirmed the circuit
court by holding Amendment 5 lacked enabling legislation, the Act
was still good law, and property owners within the district could be
taxed under the Act regardless of whether they were polluters or nonpolluters.
Kirstin E. McMillan
VLX Props., Inc. v. S. States Utils., Inc., No. 5D99-3314, 2000 Fla. App.
LEXIS 9251 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. July 21, 2000) (holding that, in the
case of flooding due to release of treated wastewater from a wastewater
treatment plant with the power of eminent domain, the legal standard
for inverse condemnation is the standard of physical invasion and not
the deprivation of all reasonable use of the property).
VLX Properties, Inc. ("VLX") owned part of James Pond ("Pond")
which was inadvertently included in an agreement between a golf
course owner and a wastewater facility ("SSU") for disposal of treated
wastewater. VLX planned to use the area around the Pond to develop
homes. However, flooding from the Pond due to the release of the
wastewater made those plans impossible. VLX filed a petition for
inverse condemnation. The trial court ruled VLX did not meet the
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inverse condemnation "taking by flooding" requirement of deprivation
of all VLX's reasonable use of the property.
VLX appealed and the court of appeals reversed. The appellate
court ruled the correct legal standard involved the question of whether
a continuing physical invasion of the property existed. The court
stated it was not the flooding that caused the taking, but the taking
that caused the flooding. In considering the water flow a continuing
physical invasion, the court concluded VLX proved the three elements
needed to constitute inverse condemnation under the physical
invasion standard. First, SSU entered upon private property with the
water for more than a momentary period. Second, SSU entered under
color of legal authority because SSU was a utility with eminent domain
powers. Third, SSU devoted the property to public use by releasing
the treated wastewater. Under the physical invasion standard, VLX
need not show deprivation of all reasonable use of the property. Thus,
VLX recovered in inverse condemnation, not because there was a
taking by flooding, but because there was a taking by physical invasion.
Tiffany Turner

IDAHO
Dupont v. Idaho State Bd.of Land Comm'rs, 7 P.3d 1095 (Idaho 2000)
(affirming state land board's decision revoking a dock permit granted
in a designated swimming area).
Dupont filed an application with the Idaho Department of Lands
("Department") seeking permission to construct a private dock in the
waters abutting his property. The Department communicated with the
City of Coeur d'Alene ("City") several times regarding the application
of city ordinances to Dupont's proposed dock. In 1992, the State
Board of Land Commissioners ("Board") issued the dock permit when
no timely objections were filed. Subsequently, the Department filed a
notice of appeal regarding Dupont's permit. Likewise, the City
notified the Department of its objection to the permit and requested
the Board to reconsider. The Department scheduled an informal
hearing and concluded the Board validly issued the permit. However,
in 1993, after a hearing officer's recommendation from de novo
contested case hearing, the Board issued a decision revoking Dupont's
permit due to "unusual circumstances." The Board concluded the
proposed dock violated City boating ordinances preventing the
operation of a boat within a designated swimming area.
Dupont appealed to the district court. The district court
concluded the Board's order revoking the permit was erroneous. The
district court determined no procedure existed by which the Board

